

Neither Independent nor Self-Sufficient: The Story of India's Public Service Broadcasting

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From a single channel in 1990, to more than 800 channels today, Indian television has come a long way. The public service broadcaster, Doordarshan, hasn't been able to live up to expectations that the Public Service Broadcasting model elsewhere has generated. In this context, it is significant to analyse the policy framework within which Doordarshan operates. Researches in the field of Indian broadcasting and policy have mostly looked at the absence of a clear regulatory framework for the industry. However, the impact of existing policies on public service broadcasting and the need for fresh perspective remains unexplored. This research paper examines the impact of existing policies mostly notably the Prasar Bharati Act, 1990 and other policy decisions on Doordarshan. It reveals that the public broadcaster in India hasn't been empowered with adequate autonomy and is crippled financially to make any impact. The paper offers a roadmap for reform for the beleaguered public service broadcaster.

Keywords: Public service broadcasting, Doordarshan, broadcasting policy, India

At its inception, television in India was modelled on the West-European model of public service broadcasting. Since then the contours of broadcasting and public service broadcasting, in particular, have changed drastically. From a single channel till 1990, today there are more than 800 channels representing every kind of genre (Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 2015). In such a context, one expects policy to be robust and dynamic in order to respond to the emerging needs.

Rules related to broadcasting were governed by the 1885 Indian Telegraph Act till the satellite-backed entry of foreign channels forced a 'de-facto deregulation of Indian television broadcasting' (Agrawal and Raghaviah, 2006; Page and Crawley, 2001; Singhal and Rogers, 2001; Sinha, 1998). Mehta (2008) provides a summary of the laws in place with regard to broadcasting. He says that the Indian state has been unable to evolve a new coherent regulatory order to deal with the changes in broadcasting. After an initial period of denial by the state, what ultimately emerged was a series of loose and parallel systems of control, often at cross-purposes with each other and none very effective (Mehta, 2008). The only legislation for public service broadcasting is the Prasar Bharati Act that merely outlines the separation rather the lack of it from the government. It is significant to note here that for the first three decades of television in the country, autonomy of the state broadcaster was the major issue. Two committees appointed by the government viz. the Ashok Chanda Committee and the B.G. Verghese-led Working Group had called for an autonomous corporation for radio and television in the country. Such proposals, however,

didn't get enough support from the political fraternity, claims Mehta (ibid). The Prasar Bharti Act passed in 1990 to grant autonomy to the public broadcaster was kept in abeyance for a long time and finally enacted in 1997. By that time the whole broadcasting media environment had changed and this law was found to be grossly inadequate (Mehta, 2008; Page and Crawley, 2001).

Herman and McChesney (2001) show how policy has had a role globally in shaping public service broadcasting. They cite the case of USA where the Communications Act of 1934 marginalised public television in that country. Similarly in Britain, significant changes occurred in British broadcasting during the rule of Margaret Thatcher. There were cuts on funding for the public broadcaster BBC, political appointments were made to its supervisory positions, and private players, most notably global media baron Rupert Murdoch were given concessions through policy.

Page and Crawley (2001) deliberate at length on the role policy should play in the changed circumstances. They contend that the role of the state is to provide enabling regulation—a regime that allows creative programming to flourish. They further argue that public bodies with a tradition of autonomy rather than the government should have roles as guardians of the public broadcasting system.

Singhal and Rogers (2001) offer a different perspective by saying that Indian policy's biggest failure lies in not being able to formulate a clear policy on public service broadcasting. They argue that policy makers in India have been more concerned about hardware expansion and quantitative targets rather than with programme software and its relevance.

Rodrigues (2010) summarised the Indian government's television policy to date as follows:

A monopoly for the public service broadcaster between 1960-1990s,
Expansion of hardware,
Neglect of quality programming,
Bureaucratic and ministerial control of the public service broadcaster,
'No-action' strategy on the expansion of foreign and satellite television services especially in the 1990s, and Ad-hoc policy decisions since the 1990s.

Objectives

- (i) To undertake a review of existing policies and directives w.r.t. autonomy and funding and their impact on Doordarshan.
- (ii) To offer a roadmap for reform based on inputs received from Doordarshan personnel.

Methodology

The research paper is based on primary as well as secondary data. Primary data was collected through in-depth interviews with serving and retired Doordarshan personnel. The people interviewed for the study served as key informants who shared vital inputs. The primary data was collected by the researcher as part of her doctoral research wherein a total of 60 respondents were interviewed. The data collected through in-depth interviews was organised and analysed using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas ti.

The secondary data included policy documents, Act of Parliament, and reports of various working groups and committees constituted by the government as well as industry associations. For in-depth interviews, purposive sampling and snowball sampling methods were used to arrive at the sample of key informants.

Discussion of Findings

Autonomy and the Public Broadcaster

Doordarshan functioned as a department directly controlled by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting until 1997 when the Prasar Bharati Act, 1990 came into force. As discussed above, the proposal of granting autonomy to Doordarshan has had a long history with the Ashok Chanda Committee advocating for the same way back in 1964. The Chanda Committee observed: "It is not possible in the Indian context for a creative medium like broadcasting to flourish under a regime of departmental rules and regulations. It is only by institutional change that AIR¹ can be liberated from the present rigid financial and administrative procedures of government" (as cited in Verghese, 1978, p.5).

The second review of broadcasting in India was undertaken by the Working Group on Autonomy for Akashvani and Doordarshan, popularly known as the Verghese Committee² in 1977-78. The Verghese Committee drafted the Akash Bharati Bill, 1978. It recommended the creation of a National Broadcast Trust (NBT) to be run as a non-profit making body, an essential public service licensed to operate under a Parliamentary charter and accountable to Parliament (Verghese, 1978, p.20). Significantly, the Verghese Committee had suggested that autonomy of the public corporation and its independence from the government be mentioned in the Constitution so that it cannot be abridged.

Many years later when the V.P. Singh-led central government came to power in 1989, the issue of autonomy for broadcasting resurfaced. The government started a countrywide consultation process to prepare a legislation that would give the electronic media autonomy. The earlier Verghese Committee Report on autonomy was studied. Finally, a new bill was drafted for legislation to create an autonomous corporation called Prasar Bharati that would incorporate both All India Radio and Doordarshan (Ninan, 1995).

Parliament introduced and passed the Prasar Bharati Act, 1990. However, observers claim that this Act was a severe dilution of the earlier Act as well as the spirit of the Verghese Committee Report that argued for such a body (Jeffrey, 2006; Ninan 1995). Ninan (1995) argued that "the country's parliamentarians ensured that the legislation incorporated a provision that a committee of members of Parliament would preside over the governing body of the corporation" (p. 38).

Though the bill was passed it couldn't be implemented as the government lost power. Thereafter, the Prasar Bharati Act was kept in abeyance for a long time and finally enacted in 1997. It is significant to note that since its enforcement in 1997, three committees have been set up by successive union governments to examine the Prasar Bharati Act and suggest modifications.

The first of these was the Nitesh Sengupta Committee³ set up in 1995 (henceforth mentioned as Sengupta Committee). In 2000, the government set up another committee comprising of high-profile public luminaries such as Kiran Karnik, marketing consultant Shunu Sen, and N.R. Narayanamurthy. Shunu Sen was appointed as chairman of the committee (henceforth Shunu Sen Committee⁴). The last one was constituted as recent as in 2013 under the leadership of Sam Pitroda, Advisor to the then Prime Minister on Public Information Infrastructure and Innovation (henceforth Pitroda Committee⁵).

One of the core areas of concern in Doordarshan today is the state of personnel. Section 11 of the Prasar Bharati Act, which addresses the issue of transfer of service of existing employees to the Corporation, says that all officers and employees in service as on the 1st day of April, 2000, shall be on deemed deputation to the Corporation from this date till their retirement. In its review, the Shunu Sen Committee (2000) recommended that

transfer of any employee to Prasar Bharati should be done only after the express consent of the Chief Executive. The Sen and the Pitroda Committee were unanimous in their decision that existing employees should be given the option to revert to the government or become Prasar Bharati employees.

Another issue at Doordarshan when it comes to autonomy has been the induction of officers of the Indian Information Service (IIS) in the news wing. The newsrooms in Doordarshan were and are still managed by officers from the IIS. Such officials are recruited primarily through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), and are government officers. They are sent to Doordarshan on deputation and work as editors at different levels and even as correspondents (Ghose, 2005). The Act had ruled that such employees can continue on deputation basis at Prasar Bharati. However, the Sengupta Committee (1996) felt that it should be the prerogative of the Corporation to allow such officers on deputation basis. The Sen Committee (2000) had strongly opposed the deputation of government employees to Prasar Bharati while the Pitroda Committee (2014) had suggested that appropriate amendments may be considered to make provision for absorption of government employees in Prasar Bharati after due screening.

Section 12(5) of the Prasar Bharati Act says that for the purposes of ensuring that adequate time is made available for the promotion of the objectives set out in this section, the Central Government shall have the power to determine the maximum limit of broadcast time in respect of advertisements. The Sengupta Committee (1996) as well as the Sen Committee (2000) felt that it is not desirable that the Central Government set such limits. They argued that the Corporation should be free to take its own decisions in such matters. Two other provisions of the Act, namely, Section 24 and Section 32 empower the Central Government to obtain information from the Corporation (as it may deem necessary), and make rules in respect of certain service matters such as salary, allowances, among others (w.r.t. Prasar Bharati members) respectively. The Sen Committee (2000) felt that asking the Corporation to furnish information (excluding financial information) amounts to unnecessary involvement besides giving sweeping power to the Central Government to get involved in the day-to-day functioning of the corporation. In response to Section 32, the Pitroda Committee (2014) noted that the Corporation should be given complete authority to take care of all human resource and personnel issues.

The chief recommendations of the three committees are listed below:

Prasar Bharati's vision must be to become a genuine public broadcaster as opposed to a government broadcaster.

Prasar Bharati, while being accountable to the Parliament for broader policy direction, must be independent on all operational decisions.

Prasar Bharati must become independent of government funding in the long-term.

Prasar Bharati must change the composition of its board so that employees of Prasar Bharati are not on the board.

The data from the in-depth interviews suggests that Doordarshan has never enjoyed real autonomy. When asked to give their feedback about Doordarshan's autonomy, respondents have pointed to different kinds of autonomy that a creative organisation needs. This includes financial autonomy, functional autonomy, personnel autonomy and programming autonomy. It is significant to note that in the context of programming, the need for autonomy was expressed more for news. News is believed to be that part of programming which successive governments have shown maximum inclination to control. In any discussion of autonomy, financial autonomy emerges as the key concern (discussed

in the next section). Another relevant aspect is that of personnel autonomy. Since the creation of Prasar Bharati, there has been no clarity on recruitment policies. Before Prasar Bharati came into being, UPSC⁶ was in-charge of making recruitment to both All India Radio and Doordarshan on similar lines as with other government directorates. With the setting up of Prasar Bharati in 1997, UPSC stopped recruiting for these two organizations as Prasar Bharati was now a statutory body. Since 1997, no recruitment took place for 16 years in Prasar Bharati for regular vacancies (The Indian Express, 2012).

Some of the other failures of Prasar Bharati were described as follows:

Failure to come up with recruitment rules for more than 16 years since its creation.

Inability to formulate and express a vision for public service broadcasting in the country.

Failure to come up with clear guidelines on personnel issues.

A few suggestions were also made regarding the Prasar Bharati Act. The opinion seemed to be that the Prasar Bharati Act is defective and poorly drafted, and therefore, should be re-examined in the contemporary context.

Funding Public Service Broadcasting in India

Closely linked to the aspect of autonomy is the funding pattern of Doordarshan. Currently, government budgetary grant is the primary source of sustaining Doordarshan. The plan funds for Prasar Bharati⁷ are allocated by the Planning Commission. The plan funds used by Prasar Bharati require furnishing of utilization certificates. These are used for projects in content creation and procurement of equipment. The non-plan funds cover employee salaries given in the form of grants-in-aid from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Pitroda Committee Report, 2014).

Till 1976, Doordarshan and All India Radio (AIR) were funded by a license fee on the lines of public broadcasters such as the BBC. License fee, a tax linked to ownership of receivers has been the historical form of financing public broadcasting (WRTVC, 2001). In 1976, the license fee was abolished and commercials began to be accepted on Doordarshan in order to increase revenue. The decision to scrap the license fee is seen as a major turning point for public service broadcasting in India. It is believed to have closed the door on Doordarshan's ability to get a substantial and regular source of funds that were not affecting any other government resource (Ghose, 2005).

The license fee is considered to be the best method of funding public service broadcasting because it is largely independent of government or commercial pressures. This model ensures that "it is the people who pay for PSB⁸, not the government, so finances of the entity do not form part of the government's annual spending reviews or budget setting" (Banerjee & Seneviratne, 2005, p. 115).

The 1980s was a period of rapid expansion for Doordarshan due to the introduction of colour television and a series of popular shows. Advertising eventually opened up on Doordarshan supported by a heavy mix of entertainment programming on offer. McDowell (1997) noted that the decision to introduce colour television was influenced by the commercial appeal of the more attractive medium.

By 1994, the Government ordered Doordarshan to raise its own resources for future expansion (Ninan, 1995; Rodrigues, 2010; & Sinha, 1998). Media scholar Nikhil Sinha remarked that this new commercial mandate gradually began to change Doordarshan's perception of its primary constituents (Sinha, 2013).

Former Director General of Doordarshan, Rathikant Basu held that dependence on commercial revenues had the outcome of making Doordarshan more audience-oriented. He noted that by the mid-1990s, Doordarshan had overtaken other channels both in terms of ratings as well as commercial revenues. He added that going commercial had become imperative by then as Doordarshan had to follow the priorities set by the government. "If the government says you need to earn more money, we have to follow that path. As a result, Doordarshan made a lot more entertainment programmes in the 1990s (Basu, 2012)."

However, Doordarshan's fortunes dwindled soon thereafter as its private counterparts surpassed Doordarshan in the next few years as the primary choice for advertisers. Doordarshan's share of television advertising dropped from 78 per cent in 1989 to 68 per cent in 1993 (Ninan, 1995). Till about a few years ago, Prasar Bharati (including AIR and DD), had less than 10 per cent share of the Rs. 15,000 crore earned by broadcasters every year through advertising (Dasgupta and Mitra, 2012).

Ninan (2014) reasons that although in the public mind functional autonomy would seem to be the most pressing issue governing the future of Doordarshan, the more fundamental problem is that of scarce broadcasting resources for the public broadcaster. "Every year since its inception, Prasar Bharati has received financial assistance from the government to cover a substantial part of its operating expenses. The amount received under this head in the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 were Rs. 1170, 1518, 1270 and 1730 crore respectively" (Pitroda Committee Report, p. 122).

For 2014-15, "the allocated budget estimate for Doordarshan under the non-plan funds was Rs. 1823 crore. More than Rs. 1000 crore out of that was for salary and staff related expenditure, another Rs. 346 crore for administration. The core area of software programme expenses received the least, Rs. 275 crore for 33 channels" under the Doordarshan banner (Ninan, 2014).

Doordarshan is dependent on the government for funding its capital expenditure as well as meeting operating expenses. The government pays the salary bill for all employees but major part of operational expenses has to be met by Prasar Bharati through self-generation of revenues. A substantial proportion of revenue also comes from the government, from the programmes it creates and broadcasts for different ministries of the government. In recent years, Doordarshan's revenue earnings have also diminished. In 2015, Doordarshan earned Rs. 993 crore as revenue whereas in 2013 it had earned Rs. 1145.44 crore (Venugopal, 2015 & Indiantelevision.com, 2015). Out of the revenues earned, bulk of it goes to run the terrestrial network on to which 20-22 million subscribers are hooked (Dasgupta and Mitra, 2012).

"Doordarshan has a network of 1415 transmitters spread across the country (57 per cent of these are located in the tribal and border areas). Out of the 33 television channels under Doordarshan, only two, DD National and DD News are available in terrestrial mode. The terrestrial setup allows Doordarshan to achieve 82 per cent geographical coverage and 92 per cent population coverage" (Pitroda Committee Report, pp. 35-36).

A number of Doordarshan officials admitted that maintaining the terrestrial network is a huge cost for them. Former ADG (Engineering), H.K. Wadhwa, said that they have to send engineers on periodic visits to these places for service and repair all of which adds up to the operational costs (Wadhwa, 2013). Former Director-General of Doordarshan, Tripurari Sharan acknowledged such concerns. He noted, "The major part of our revenue goes into operational expenses. After that we are left with very little money for programming. As a result, we do not have the flexibility enjoyed by the private channels" (Sharan, 2013).

The emphasis on maintaining the terrestrial network perhaps explains why Doordarshan is an engineering-driven organisation as opposed to programme-driven. "In

terms of composition of human resources, 44.4 per cent of the employees work on the Engineering aspects, 36.9 per cent in Administrative support services and only 18.7 per cent in the core function of Programming" (Pitroda Committee Report, p. 147). During the interviews, a number of respondents reiterated that it is time to switch over to satellite-based distribution platforms from the terrestrial network in order to reduce costs.

Former ADG (Programming), Ranjan P. Thakur made a passionate call for replacing terrestrial with satellite based platforms such as Direct-to-Home (DTH). He said: "Terrestrial broadcasting is dying, why the country spends 2000 crores on terrestrial when nobody is watching? Why can't DTH replace that?" He believes that today's generation (even in rural areas) is aspirational and they would not want to watch merely two channels which Doordarshan's terrestrial network offers at present. Therefore, the future is not in terrestrial, he conceded (Thakur, 2013).

The 'Expert Group on Technology' within the ambit of the Sam Pitroda-led committee suggested a move to satellite transmission as primary mode of transmission. "They recommended that Doordarshan should switch off analog terrestrial and adopt DD Direct (a free DTH service offered by Doordarshan) as primary mode of transmission" (p.26). The Committee further noted that the switch over to satellite will prove to be more cost-effective as "it will allow Prasar Bharati achieve annual savings of approximately Rs. 635 crore of operational expenses towards maintenance and operations" (Pitroda Committee Report, 2014, p. 27).

A major challenge faced by public broadcasters around the world is the strain on public resources for broadcasting. Michael Tracey in his book *The Decline and Fall of Public Service Broadcasting* predicts that the "notion of paying for television from the public treasury will become increasingly rare, replaced by commercial funding and direct payment" (Tracey, 1998, p. 34).

In India, Doordarshan is unable to earn substantial revenue on its own. Since the costs are exponentially higher than revenues, Doordarshan depends substantially on government funds. Such dependence on the government restricts the scope for autonomy. At the same time, commercial funding in the form of advertisement generated revenue brings its own set of concerns for a public broadcaster. This is one area which hasn't been addressed satisfactorily by any government. The researcher found that opinion is divided (among experts) on possible ways of funding public service broadcasting in India.

Rajiv Mehrotra, Managing Trustee of the Public Service Broadcasting Trust (PSBT) believes that a developing country such as ours has to allocate public funds for a diverse set of concerns and broadcasting may not be a priority area there. He explained, "We cannot expect the government to make the kind of public investment that happens in other countries. In a democracy, there are different concerns to take care of. Parliament has to choose between building hospitals and sustaining public service broadcasting in the country. These are competing priorities. So how can you neglect health and devote funds to public service broadcasting though I may feel it is equally important." He feels that greater government support is not a viable solution (Mehrotra, 2013).

A number of observers held a contrary view. To them such comparisons weren't valid. They argued that broadcasting is also an essential public service that must be adequately supported. Media scholar and former Vice-chancellor of the Shiv Nadar University, Nikhil Sinha while making a case for public broadcasting said if the government so desires, it can always find funds to support public broadcasting (Sinha, 2013).

Usha M. Rodrigues who has done extensive research on Indian broadcasting and policy matters, rejects the idea of government not being able to allocate enough funds. She insisted that the government has no money of its own; it is public money that is used to

fund Doordarshan. Rodrigues explained, “When we talk about funding of Doordarshan in India or in any of the developing countries they see it as being government funded rather than the words being used, it is tax-payer funded. In Australia, whenever, we talk about public service broadcasting it is referred to as tax-payer funded public service broadcaster. So the whole onus or the burden shifts from it being funded by somebody rather than it being funded by all of us together” (Rodrigues, 2013).

Opinion appeared to be split on the question of whether quality public service programming can be sustained in the long-term through commercial revenues. Apprehensions were expressed about advertisers’ willingness to pay for content which may not be targeted at lucrative audiences. One respondent argued that good quality public service programmes will not find the kind of affluent audiences that advertisers look for (Mehrotra, 2013). In similar vein, another observer added that programming which can be used for public good has no place in a system “dependent on delivering audiences to advertisers” (Sinha, 2013).

Financing public service broadcasting remains an unresolved predicament the world over. In this context, it is pertinent to look at international experience. Most international public broadcasters fulfill their mission using a mix of external resources and their own resources. The BBC, for instance, depends upon licensing fee for its entire revenue with no share from advertisements. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) gets 85 per cent of its funding from government and 15 per cent is self-generated, mostly from merchandising. Al Jazeera too is financed mostly from government grants with limited advertisements (Pitroda Committee Report, 2014). The following table reveals the sources of funding of some of the major public service broadcasters around the world.

Sources of funds of major public service broadcasters in the world

S. No.	Name of Broadcaster	Mode of funding
1.	United Kingdom – BBC	Primary source – TV license fee (97%)
2.	Australia – ABC	Primary source – Special parliamentary appropriation
3.	Canada – CBC	Primary source – Direct annual grants Other sources – advertising, subscriptions, property rentals.
4.	France – France Television	Primary source – annual license fee paid by TV owners Other sources – direct public transfers, advertising (decreasing every year) and sponsorship of programmes, selling audio-visual works.

Source: Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005) & Mendel (2011)

Conclusion

The analysis here suggests that Doordarshan is far from being an autonomous public broadcaster. Closely linked to it is the aspect of funding. It is critical for the public broadcaster to have a stable, substantial and regular source of income in order to do good programming, hire and retain talent, and remain independent of market fluctuations and undue government influence. In this regard, the decision of the Planning Commission in the mid-1990s to ask Doordarshan to raise revenues on its own for its future expansion is seen as one with far reaching consequences. This decision is believed to have pushed Doordarshan towards greater commercialisation, while not influencing revenue in a significant manner in the absence of programming reform.

While conducting this research, it was observed that a sizable section of Doordarshan's own employees have internalised its identity as the 'government channel'. This section believes that since the present television landscape in India is dominated by private networks, it is imperative for the government to have its own mouthpiece to put forth its point of view. The history of broadcasting in India seems to have played a role in reinforcing this mind-set. Both radio and television took off as government departments. Further, radio and television (All India Radio and Doordarshan), from their inception, were conceptualised as an agent of development to be used by the government of the day to advance its socio-economic project.

These constraints notwithstanding, veteran broadcasters and serving personnel believe that if major reforms are taken urgently, Doordarshan may well revive its past glory. Firstly, innovative ways of funding public service broadcasting have to be found. This would include leveraging assets such as infrastructure (production studios etc.) and real estate, monetising archives, and a complete shift from terrestrial to satellite (including DTH) as primary mode of transmission to cut manpower and technical costs.

To conclude, the need for complete independence from government control remains the key challenge for public service broadcasting in India. It has been well established that Doordarshan has never been at arm's length from the government, one of the founding principles of public service broadcasting. It was suggested that the first step towards autonomy has to be in the area of funding; Prasar Bharati should have access to guaranteed public money. In the current television set-up of India, there is a need for a sane and restrained public broadcaster. The interdependent challenges of autonomy and assured finances related to public service broadcasting, therefore, must be addressed at the earliest.

Notes

¹At that time, television in India functioned under All India Radio (AIR), the radio arm of broadcasting and was known as AIR TV.

^{1A}'A Working Group on Autonomy for Akashvani and Doordarshan' was set up under the leadership of eminent media personnel B.G. Verghese to examine the functional, financial and legal aspects of the proposal to give autonomy to Akashvani (Radio) and Doordarshan (Television). The Working Group submitted its report in February 1978.

²This group was set up by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vide a notification dated 28th December, 1995 under the Chairmanship of Dr.N.K.Sengupta to review the provisions of PrasarBharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 and to make recommendations regarding the restructuring of PrasarBharati. The report was submitted in 1996.

³A high-level committee under the leadership of Shunu Sen was set up on November 23, 2000 by the government to review the working of PrasarBharati. The committee was asked to carry out a comprehensive review and make recommendations about organisational structure and legal framework keeping in view the responsibilities of a public service broadcaster and to ensure quality, credibility and professionalism.

⁴An expert committee headed by Sam Pitroda was set up to review the functioning of Prasar Bharti on January 28, 2013 by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The committee was tasked with reviewing the institutional framework of PrasarBharati, including its relationship with Government, its continuing role as a public broadcaster and measures needed to ensure technical up-gradation of the organisation.

⁵The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) is the central recruiting agency in India for various Central Civil Services and Posts and Services common to the Union and States.

⁷Doordarshan comes under PrasarBharati

⁸ Public service broadcasting

⁹ Additional Director General

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